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Abstract: We analyze the role of institutions in resolving systemic banking crises for a 
broad sample of countries.  Banking crises are fiscally costly, especially when policies 
like substantial liquidity support, explicit government guarantees on financial institutions’ 
liabilities, and forbearance from prudential regulations are used.  Higher fiscal outlays do 
not, however, accelerate the recovery from a crisis.  Better institutions—less corruption, 
improved law and order, legal system, and bureaucracy—do.  We find these results to be 
relatively robust to estimation techniques, including controlling for the effects of a poor 
institutional environment on the likelihood of financial crisis and the size of fiscal costs.  
Our results suggest that countries should use strict policies to resolve a crisis and use the 
crisis as an opportunity to implement medium-term structural reforms, which will also 
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A systemic crisis is a situation where an economy faces large-scale banking and 
corporate distress within a short period. It is typically characterized by large-scale 
defaults, sharp increases in nonperforming loans, and often a general economic 
slowdown.  Importantly, large fiscal costs are often incurred to resolve the crisis. There 
have been many systemic financial crises: Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven and Noguera 
(2004) identify 93 countries that experienced a systemic financial crisis between 1980 
and 2002.  Crises also appear to have become more common and deeper in the 1990s and 
early 2000s relative to earlier periods (Bordo et al. 2001).  Country examples during the 
1990s include the Nordic countries in the early 1990s, Mexico in 1994–95, East Asian 
countries after 1997, Argentina in 2001, and Turkey in 2001–02. 
A systemic crisis involves complicated coordination problems.  The fate of an 
individual corporation or financial institution and the best course of action for its owners 
and managers will depend on the actions of many others and the general economic 
outlook.  Because of these coordination problems, as well as a lack of capital and the 
importance of the financial system to economic growth, governments often take the lead 
in systemic restructuring, especially of the banking system.  In the process, governments 
often incur large fiscal costs, presumably with the objective to accelerate the recovery 
from the crisis. A complicating factor is that a crisis is typically aggravated by 
institutional weaknesses, many of which likely contributed to the emergence of the crisis 
in the first place. Bankruptcy and restructuring frameworks are often deficient. 
Disclosure and accounting rules for financial institutions and corporations may be weak. 
Equity and creditor rights may be poorly defined or weakly enforced.  And the judiciary   3
system is often inefficient.  The government itself may face credibility problems as it 
may be partly to blame for the crisis, and, in general, faces time consistency problems. 
And corruption may be large. 
This short discussion already shows that resolving systemic crises and accelerating 
recovery is not easy.  Opinions differ widely on what constitutes best or even good 
practice. Many approaches have been proposed and tried to resolve systemic crises more 
efficiently.  Sometimes, contradictory policy recommendations have been made in the 
midst of a crisis, as happened notably in case of East Asia, but also elsewhere.  Part of 
these differences may arise because objectives of the policy advice have varied.  Some 
have focused on reducing the fiscal costs of financial crises, others on limiting the 
economic costs in terms of lost output and on accelerating restructuring, while again 
others have focused on achieving long-term, structural reforms.  But trade-offs may arise 
between these objectives.  Governments may, for example, through certain policies 
consciously incur large fiscal outlays in resolving a banking crisis, with the objective to 
accelerate recovery.  Or structural reforms may only be politically feasible in the context 
of a severe crisis with large output losses and high fiscal costs. 
Empirical research supporting particular policy views or clarifying the role of 
institutional factors remains limited.  Most research has focused on individual cases, 
making it difficult to generalize.  Cross-country analysis can help shed light on how fiscal 
outlays relate to the speed of recovery and how this may vary with the institutional 
environment of countries.  This can help prioritize policies as policies that increase the 
fiscal outlays of resolving a crisis may or may not accelerate the economic recovery 
depending on the institutional environment of the country.  So far, there has been limited   4
cross-country analysis on how fiscal outlays and recovery relate.  The main paper to date 
is Honohan and Klingebiel (2003).  They find that accommodative policy measures, such 
as substantial liquidity support, explicit government guarantee on financial institutions’ 
liabilities and forbearance from prudential regulations, tend to be fiscally costly and that 
these particular policies do not accelerate the speed of recovery.  However, the authors 
focus less on the institutional frameworks within which these policies take place.  It 
might well be that the effectiveness of fiscal outlays depends on the institutional 
environment, or even that the importance of the institutional environment dominates the 
effectiveness of any fiscal outlays.   
We are interested in examining what combination of fiscal outlays, policy choices 
and institutional frameworks have proven to be the most effective in terms of resolving a 
systemic crisis.  Specifically, we investigate how fiscal outlays associated with resolving 
a systemic crisis relate to economic output losses and how this relationship depends on a 
country’s policy choices and institutional characteristics. We try to answer these 
questions using a country-level database on fiscal outlays and output losses for 29 
countries with systemic banking crises.   
We confirm that the size of fiscal cost is related to the extent to which countries 
adopt accommodative policies, in particular explicit government guarantees on financial 
institutions’ liabilities and forbearance from prudential regulations. When examining 
whether fiscal outlays produce faster recovery, we find that output losses are reduced by 
fiscal outlays and that none of the specific policy measures we study positively affects 
this relationship.  Rather the opposite, we find that some of the policy measures in fact 
appear to worsen the effects of fiscal outlays on economic recovery.  On the other hand,   5
we find that better institutional development—general quality of institutions, less 
corruption, and a more efficient judicial system—is uniformly positively associated with 
faster recovery.  These measures of institutional development are also important 
determinants of the fiscal outlays.  These results suggests that countries should adopt 
strict policies to resolve a crisis and that they furthermore should use the crisis as an 
opportunity to implement medium-term structural reforms, which will also help avoid 
future systemic crises.  Our empirical analysis provides a starting point to disentangle 
what elements of the institutional framework are most important to accelerate recovering 
from a crisis.  Calculating such “returns” from institutional improvements may help guide 
policy makers in setting priorities for reform. 
The paper itself is structured as follows.  Section 1 briefly reviews the related 
literature, describes some of the main debates regarding systemic crisis resolution, and 
develops the main hypotheses.  The section also reviews the key policy measures for 
resolving a financial crisis that are associated with fiscal outlays. Section 2 provides a 
description of the data and the empirical methodology used.  Section 3 provides the 
results of the regressions that explain the policy determinants of fiscal outlays and 
explain the speed of recovery, relative to the fiscal outlays.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
1.  Literature Review and Key Policy Measures 
We start with a definition of a systemic crisis.  Under our definition, in a systemic crisis, 
a country’s corporate and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults and 
financial institutions and corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. 
As a result, non-performing loans increase sharply and all or most of the aggregate   6
banking system capital is exhausted. This situation may be accompanied by depressed 
asset prices (such as equity and real estate prices) on the heels of run-ups before the 
crisis, sharp increases in real interest rates, and a slowdown or reversal in capital flows.  
In countries with longer-term structural problems—such as early on in many transition 
economies—a systemic crisis may not be accompanied by such changes in asset prices 
and capital flows, partly because run-ups in prices and capital flows may not have 
occurred.
1  
In reviewing the literature on systemic crises, especially for emerging markets, it is 
useful to differentiate between three phases of systemic restructuring (see also Chapter 
2). During the first phase, which can be called the containment phase, the financial crisis 
is still unfolding. During this phase, governments tend to implement policies aimed at 
restoring public confidence to minimize the repercussions on the real sector of the loss of 
confidence by depositors and other investors in the financial system. The second phase 
involves the actual financial, and to a lesser extent operational, restructuring of financial 
institutions and corporations. The third phase involves structural reforms, including 
changes in laws and regulations, and other institutional reforms, the privatization of any 
nationalized financial institutions and corporations, and so on. In this chapter we discuss 
mainly the containment phase, and to a certain extent the restructuring phase.  We do not 
include the third phase in our analysis and refer the reader to the more general literature 
on financial sector development (e.g., World Bank 2002, and Levine 2004). 
                                                 
1 Note that this definition of a systemic crisis excludes situations of systemic stress or heightened risks, 
such as the 1987 US stock markets crash, the uncertainty surrounding the Y2K turnover, or the events of 
September 11, 2001 which paralyzed payments and clearing systems.  During these periods, central banks 
in many countries were involved in large-scale liquidity support as the banking systems were under 
(expected) stress, but the stress situations were short-lived and largely limited to the financial sectors.   7
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, most research on systemic crisis resolution 
focused on single crises, making it difficult to generalize.  Sheng (1996) was the first 
attempt to distill lessons from several banking crises.  He stated that a comprehensive and 
credible plan could avoid a small crisis from becoming a systemic crisis, minimize 
adverse effects if a crisis nevertheless occurred, and limit overall losses.  Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1996) expanded on those lessons studying 26 crises and Dziobek and 
Pazarbasioglu (1998) analyzed the experiences of 24 countries that faced crises in the 
1980s and early 1990s.  Also studying a cross-section of crises, Lindgren, Garcia, and 
Saal (1997) analyzed in particular the linkages between macroeconomic policy and bank 
soundness, reviewing the causes and consequences of banking sector problems and 
discussing how the banking system can be strengthened, nationally and internationally. 
The main lesson from these efforts is that managing a financial crisis is much 
different in emerging markets than in industrial countries because emerging markets have 
weaker institutions, crises are often larger, and other initial circumstances differ.  As a 
result, best practices from industrial countries do not easily transfer to developing 
countries. Another key lesson is that there appear to be tradeoffs between various 
policies, both in terms of individual objectives as well as between objectives (such as 
containing fiscal costs, speeding recovery, and preventing a recurrence of a crisis).   
Cross-country research efforts focusing on the speed and shape of general 
economic recovery from a financial crisis is more plentiful, but most often does not 
distinguish or analyze specific (financial sector) policies, beyond the provision of 
international liquidity support or the presence of a (structural) adjustment program.  It 
also often does not focus specifically on banking crises, but also includes currency and   8
other crises.
2  Two recent papers, Eichengreen and Rose (2003) and Lee and Park (2003), 
find a V-shaped recovery to be the norm in currency crises and find no discernable 
impact of crises on longer-term growth.  Others do find, however, a more protracted 
recovery and some long-term costs in terms of output growth, particularly for crises in 
emerging markets and for the more recent crises.
3  In terms of adjustment programs, Lee 
and Park (2003) find that an IMF program is associated with much sharper V-shaped 
recovery from a financial crisis, but not with better post-crisis recovery, suggesting that 
liquidity issues are paramount in crises, whereas structural reforms, as presumably 
encouraged by the IMF, mattered less.  Analyzing the impact of IMF and World Bank 
programs in both crisis and non-crisis situations, Easterly (2003) finds no effects of the 
presence of a structural adjustment program on the average rate of growth of countries. 
Hutchinson (2003) even finds that, in general, participation in IMF programs is 
associated with a reduction in GDP growth, which may, however, reflect reverse 
causality.  He finds specifically that participation in IMF programs associated with 
balance-of-payments crises does not mitigate output losses, concluding that “the cure of 
an IMF program may be worse than the disease.”    
From these analyses, one could conclude that crises are typically liquidity crises 
and that policy (choices), as reflected in the presence of an IMF or World Bank program, 
matter little in crisis resolution or may even make matters worse. One caveat is that these 
analyses did not investigate banking crises specifically, and many currency crises are not 
also banking crises.  For banking crises only, the literature on the speed of recovery is 
                                                 
2 Most banking crises are twin crises, i.e., also currency crises, but most currency crises are not also 
banking crises. 
3 For a review of the evidence on the causes and effects of currency crises see Goldstein, Kaminsky, and 
Reinhart (2000).  They also summarize the findings of eight other studies (in their Table 7.4).     9
more limited. Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) document the more protracted 
nature of the recovery from a banking crisis compared to a currency crisis.  For their 
sample of 76 currency crises and 26 banking crises, output takes on average almost twice 
as long to recover from a banking crisis than from a currency crisis (18 versus 10 
months).  Imports recover only after 29 months for a banking crisis compared to after 18 
months for a currency crisis.  Banking crises appear thus more deleterious than currency 
crises, and do not seem to fit the V-shaped recovery pattern.  Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod 
(1996) examine the resolution of several banking crises in Latin America.  They highlight 
the sluggishness of the banking resolution process in many episodes.  Still these studies, 
as most others on currency and other financial crises, do not study the effects of specific 
policy measures, and as such do not shed light on the question which policy measures are 
most successful in accelerating economic recovery in the aftermath of a crisis, and on the 
importance of the quality of the institutional environment. 
In terms of cross-country studies investigating specific financial sector 
restructuring policies, the main effort to date has been Honohan and Klingebiel (2003).  
They show that much of the variation in the fiscal cost of 40 crises in industrial and 
developing economies in 1980–97 can be explained by government approaches to 
resolving crises. They find that governments that provided open-ended liquidity support 
and blanket deposit guarantees and engaged in repeated, incomplete recapitalizations 
tended to incur much higher costs in resolving financial crises.
4 They also find no 
obvious trade-off between fiscal costs and subsequent economic growth (or overall 
output losses). Countries that used policies such as open-ended liquidity support, blanket 
                                                 
4 This view is challenged by another study, Hoggarth, Reis, and Saporta (2002), which do not find a 
statistically significant relationship between fiscal costs and lender of last resort use when controlling for a 
number of other factors, including whether there was also a currency crisis at the same time.    10
guarantees, and forbearance did not recover faster. Rather, liquidity support appeared to 
make recovery from a crisis longer and output losses larger—a finding confirmed by 
Bordo et al. (2001). Their findings suggest that the two most important policies during 
the containment phase are to limit liquidity support and not to extend blanket guarantees.   
There are also cross-country studies investigating specific systemic bank 
restructuring policies that do not involve fiscal outlays.  One study, Baer and Klingebiel 
(1995), analyzes the exceptions to the model of governments guaranteeing all liabilities 
in an effort to restore confidence.  They show that in some crises—notably the United 
States (1933), Japan (1946), Argentina (1980–82), and Estonia (1992)—governments 
imposed losses on depositors with little or no adverse macroeconomic consequences or 
flight to cash or foreign currency.  Economic recovery was relatively rapid and financial 
intermediation, including household deposits, was soon restored.  Thus allocating losses 
to creditors or depositors will not necessarily lead to runs on banks or end in contraction 
of aggregate money, credit, and output.  Baer and Klingebiel also suggest that 
intermittent regulatory intervention and forbearance make depositors more nervous and 
undermine regulatory credibility—especially if regulators had previously argued that the 
institutions involved were solvent.  Both findings suggest that more accommodative 
policies and higher fiscal outlays do not necessarily lead to faster recovery. 
Another effort to distinguish the impact of policy on recovery, but using individual 
firm level data, is Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven (2003). They study 687 corporations 
from eight crisis countries.  When analyzing the impact of policies on firms, they find 
that a package of specific resolution measures can help accelerate recovery from a crisis.  
These policies, however, did not necessarily lead to more sustainable, longer-run debt   11
situations, suggesting that they induce moral hazard on the part of financial institutions 
and corporations.  Furthermore, they studied a small cross-section of countries, raising 
the question as to whether these results can be generalized.  Klingebiel, Kroszner, and 
Laeven (2002) investigate how financial crises affect the growth of sectors that depend 
on external sources of finance to various degrees.  They use industry level data on real 
sectoral growth in value added and external financial dependence from 19 countries over 
30 years and find that sectors highly dependent on external finance tend to experience a 
greater contraction of value added during a crisis in deeper financial systems than in 
countries with shallower financial systems. Finally, the International Monetary Fund 
(2003) has recently developed lessons from financial crises, although not in an empirical 
manner. 
The studies on the containment and restructuring phase reviewed have typically 
analyzed a limited number of specific policies.  In particular, three main policies have 
received much attention in the studies and debates: substantial liquidity support, explicit 
government guarantees of deposits, and forbearance from prudential regulation.  These 
three policies are in many ways indicative of whether a more accommodative or strict 
“model” to crisis resolution is being followed.  Countries applying substantial liquidity 
support,
5 explicit government guarantees of deposits
6 and large-scale forbearance from 
prudential regulations can be said to have an accommodative approach to crisis 
resolution, whereas those countries with limited liquidity support, no or limited 
guarantees and no forbearance from prudential regulations have a strict approach.   
                                                 
5 Substantial liquidity support is defined as a situation in which the government provides level of liquidity 
support that exceed aggregate banking sector capital and/or also provides support to institutions that are 
clearly known to be insolvent. 
6 A government is considered to be providing an explicit full guarantee to depositors if it explicitly protects 
all depositors and creditors.   12
Another advantage of focusing on these policies is that they are easily identifiable for 
empirical analyses.  
These three policies are nevertheless not the only ones countries can adopt.   
Furthermore, except for explicit government guarantees of deposits,
7 these policies can 
still vary as to their intensity: countries can provide more or less liquidity support or 
practice more or less forbearance. Another measure of the degree to which the 
government has employed an accommodative or strict approach to crisis resolution can 
be the total fiscal costs the government has incurred. Countries providing more liquidity 
support, explicit full guarantees, and forbearance from prudential regulation tend to incur 
greater fiscal costs, with the costs increasing in the degree of accommodative policy.  In 
contrast, countries that have more strict policies, by for example imposing some of the 
costs of the crisis on depositors (as analyzed by Baer and Klingebiel, 1995), will tend to 
incur smaller fiscal costs.  
Countries not only vary in their adoption of policies aimed at containing and 
resolving a systemic crisis, but also in the quality of their institutional framework and in 
their general level of development. The institutional framework most relevant to systemic 
bank restructuring includes the laws, regulations, and institutions under which banks and 
corporations, including their management and owners, operate.  The “optimal” 
framework for crisis resolution is easy to describe: A country’s insolvency system should 
enable financial institutions to enforce their claims on corporations, allow for speedy 
financial restructuring of viable corporations, and provide for the efficient liquidation of 
enterprises that have no prospects of economic value–added and cannot be rehabilitated. 
                                                 
7 Even here there can be differences. Ex-ante in the exact coverage of the guarantee and ex-post in the 
degree to which the government effectively honors the guarantee.   13
A proper prudential framework for banks includes accounting, classification, and 
provisioning rules that force a realistically marking of assets to market.  Finally, 
regulations and laws should ensure that undercapitalized financial institutions are 
properly disciplined and closed if necessary.  Institutions involved in these areas should 
be properly governed, accountable, and staffed with well-trained people facing the right 
incentives and having no conflicts of interest. 
But, this optimal framework is most often not what countries with a systemic crisis 
face, especially not developing countries.  Here, the country will often be experiencing a 
systemic crisis exactly because of its institutional deficiencies.  Insolvency procedures for 
corporations and financial institutions may be poorly designed and/or the judicial system 
poorly equipped to handle large-scale financial distress.  The transparency of decision-
making processes may be limited and corruption prevalent.  Ownership links between 
banks and corporations may be extensive, making restructuring more complex, even to 
the point that the debtor and creditor are the same party.  Political economy factors more 
generally will typically complicate the resolution.
8 
These institutional deficiencies will affect the efficacy of the policy measures in 
terms of accelerating recovery, can lower the benefits of fiscal outlays, and can increase 
the overall fiscal costs.  How this may happen can be obvious in some cases.  It will, for 
example, not be productive to let the supervisory agency also be the agency that takes the 
lead in the restructuring of financial institutions when the agency is largely to blame for 
the crisis, because it did not enforce existing regulations.  In those situations, policies 
such as forbearance may be less productive and can be expected to raise fiscal costs, 
                                                 
8 There are some that argue that the various policies chosen are purely the outcome of political economy 
circumstances that also triggered the crisis, and the whole loss-allocation is therefore a foregone 
conclusion. See, for example, Dooley and Verma (2003).   14
because financial institutions have little incentives to use the forbearance to recapitalize 
on a flow basis, i.e., with retained earnings.  They may instead “gamble for resurrection” 
because the supervisory authority does not have the credibility that it will enforce the 
regulation in the future more strictly.  By the same token, one cannot expect that ex-ante 
recapitalizations of banks (financed by the government) will result in corporate 
restructuring in countries where the bankruptcy system is not functioning and/or many 
ownership links exist between banks and corporations and the supervisory authority has 
little credibility in enforcing prudential regulations.  Notwithstanding this, in other, 
intermediate circumstances where the institutional framework is not optimal but also not 
poor, the efficacy of fiscal outlays and the effects of various resolution policies on 
economic recovery are unclear. 
How resolution policies can best be adjusted to weaknesses in the institutional 
environment is not immediately obvious.  If institutions and institutional frameworks are 
weak, one could argue that governments should be less involved and incur lower fiscal 
outlays, but this may carry the risk of a further loss of confidence and result in an even 
slower recovery.  On the other hand, one could argue that the government should be more 
involved (and incur higher fiscal outlays) in countries where institutions are weak as the 
private sector is unlikely to be able to resolve the crisis on its own given the poor 
institutional framework.  In the end, the importance of the institutional framework for the 
efficacy of resolution policies and its impact on fiscal outlays and economic recovery in 
the aftermath of a crisis is an empirical question.  Some accommodative policies for crisis 
resolution while fiscally expensive may accelerate economic recovery when institutions   15
are weak while others may delay economic recovery.  So far, however, no empirical 
analysis has attempted to shed light on these questions. 
 
 
2.  Data and Empirical Methodology 
We are interested in examining whether the quality of the institutional framework has an 
impact on the efficacy of policies for financial crisis resolution.  Specifically, we want to 
explain whether a country’s (weak) institutional framework can render accommodative 
policies of crisis resolution ineffective meaning that the adoption of these policies will 
eventually result in higher fiscal outlays and higher economic output losses compared to 
situations where a country is equipped with a better institutional framework.  We try 
answering these questions by using a country-level database.  In this section, we first 
describe the data (for a detailed description of the variables and sources see Appendix 
Table 1) and then the methodologies we apply. 
For data on fiscal outlays, we use Honohan and Klingebiel (2003), and update the 
data for recent crises using Kane and Klingebiel (2002), Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), 
and IMF (2003). Data are collected for 36 banking crisis episodes from 1977 to the 
present.  The fiscal outlay figure includes both fiscal and quasi-fiscal outlays for financial 
system restructuring, including the recapitalization costs for banks, bailout costs related 
to the government covering obligations due to depositors and creditors, and debt relief 
schemes for bank borrowers. We scale the fiscal outlay estimates by gross domestic 
product (GDP).  The variable, FISCAL OUTLAY, thus represents the fiscal outlay 
estimate of financial distress as a percentage of GDP.  We use this as a measure of the   16
degree of accommodative stand of the government during the containment and initial 
restructuring process of a crisis.   
We also collect data on a number of accommodative policies. Data on these 
policy responses come from Honohan and Klingebiel (2003), and are updated for recent 
crises by Kane and Klingebiel (2002), Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), and IMF (2003). As 
noted, we focus on three policies: substantial LIQUIDITY SUPPORT, EXPLICIT 
GUARANTEE on deposits, and regulatory FORBEARANCE.  We use a dummy variable 
for each of the three policies.  Data on policy responses are collected for 35 banking 
crisis episodes from 1977 to the present.
9  
In addition to explicit guarantees, deposits can also have an implicit government 
guarantee on deposits. For example, deposits in government-owned financial institutions 
are often (assumed to be) implicitly guaranteed by the government. Like explicit 
guarantees, implicit guarantees may affect the fiscal outlays during a crisis, and we will 
therefore want to control for the existence of implicit guarantees in our empirical 
analysis. We consider an implicit guarantee to be in place if the banking system is largely 
state-owned (75 percent or more) and the government has not issued an explicit 
guarantee. We refer to this dummy variable as IMPLICIT GUARANTEE. 
Many financial crises were proceeded by asset bubbles and credit booms. These 
may also affect the severity of the crises and the fiscal outlays, because when the boom is 
larger, the bust may also be larger and the crisis may be more costly to resolve. Since we 
do not have data on asset prices for most of the pre-crisis periods in our sample, we can 
only use (excessive) credit growth as a control measure for the size of the pre-crisis 
boom. We measure credit growth as the difference between real growth in bank credit to 
                                                 
9 We do not have data on policy responses for Jordan.   17
the private sector and real GDP growth during the three years prior to the start of the 
crisis. We call this variable CREDIT GROWTH. 
For the aggregate economic recovery, we construct proxies for economic output 
losses suffered due to a crisis.  We use two approaches here. One way is comparing, in 
real terms, the pre-crisis GDP level of a certain country with the GDP level during the 
following years until the pre-crisis level is reached.  This approach considers pre-crisis 
GDP growth rates to a country’s trend or potential growth rate. The pre-crisis, trend GDP 
growth is calculated as the average of GDP growth rates from year t-3 to t-1, where year t 
is the start of the crisis. Then, each GDP growth rate from year t onwards is compared to 
the trend until the trend growth is reached.  The output loss is defined as the sum of the 
difference between the actual and the trend growth rate over all the years until trend 
growth is reached again. This approach follows the methodology used in IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook (1998), although we recalculate and update the data to include some 
recent crises. We call this variable OUTPUT LOSS (IMF).
10  
The second version of the output loss variable results from using the Barro (1991) 
growth model to estimate a country’s GDP potential growth rates. We refer to this 
variable as OUTPUT LOSS (BARRO). Instead of using pre-crisis data to estimate the 
trend growth rate, we obtain predicted values of per capita GDP growth from equation (2) 
in Barro (1991, p. 410).  The exact equation is: Average GDP per capita growth from 
1960 to 1980 = 0.0302 - 0.0111 * GDP per capita in 1960 + 0.00051 * (GDP per capita in 
1960)
2 + 0.0323 * Secondary school enrollment rate + 0.0270 * Primary school 
enrollment rate - 0.122 * Government consumption/GDP - 0.0200 * Number of 
                                                 
10 We also counted the number of years a country needs to get to the same GDP level as prior to the crisis.  
We ran the same regression for this variable and found similar results as for the two output loss measures.   18
revolutions - 0.0309 * Number of assassinations - 0.0148 * Deviation from the PPP in 
1960.   For simplicity, the last three regressors are considered to be zero.  We collect data 
for the other variables using the Barro-Lee and Summers-Heston databases.  We use GDP 
per capita and the enrollment rates for primary and secondary school for three years 
before the start of the crisis.  For government consumption scaled by GDP, we take the 
average ratio for the period between eight years and three years before the start of the 
crisis. The quadratic form in the model of GDP per capita implies a positive relation 
between GDP per capita level and growth for values of GDP per capita above $10,800.
11 
We therefore restrict the realizations of the GDP per capita level variable to be no larger 
than $10,800.  For each country, we insert the realizations of the variables at three years 
before the start of the crisis into the Barro equation and adjust for population growth rates 
to obtain the predicted GDP growth rates.  Finally, we compare this predicted rate with 
the actual growth rates during the crisis and, following the IMF methodology, summarize 
the differential growth rates into an output loss variable.
12 
For a country’s institutional and legal environment, we use three indicators.   
QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS is a broad measure of institutional quality developed by 
                                                 
11 The quadratic form can be viewed as an approximation to a functional form that asymptotically 
approaches a zero relation between growth and level of per capita GDP, with the relation coming close to 
zero when real GDP is above $ 10,800 (Barro 1991).  For simplicity, we cut off the GDP per capita data at 
$10,800, thus forcing a flat relationship for higher actual GDP per capita. 
12 There are also a number of other measures that can be used to estimate the output loss. These differ in 
terms of the assumptions made about trend growth and the timing of the pre-crisis and post-crisis period.  
Generally, we got similar results for the fiscal outlay, policy, and institutional variables.  Still, it is worthy 
to note there are many other factors determining the potential GDP level of a certain country at a certain 
time.  Furthermore, since it is not possible to isolate the effect of the banking crisis on GDP from other 
shocks, none of these output loss measures correctly captures the effect of the banking crisis on GDP and 
the full economic costs of a banking crisis.  This caveat is the more important as there can be large 
differences between the measures.  In his discussion of the analysis of Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta (2002), for 
example, Honohan (2002) shows that their cumulative loss in output has a correlation of only 33% with the 
IMF-loss of growth measure.  Hoggarth et al. also show that using a lost cumulative output—instead of the 
lost cumulative growth measure, output losses during crises in developed countries are as high, or higher, on 
average than those in emerging economies, a conclusion which contrasts with other research.     19
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (KKZ, 1999) and captures the quality of 
institutions in the country. CORRUPTION is a measure of the level of corruption in the 
government from La Porta et al. (1998) and JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY is an index of the 
efficiency of the judicial system, also from La Porta et al. (1998). 
Our sample of countries includes those countries that experienced a systemic 
crisis during the last 30 years, as reported by Caprio and Klingebiel (1999), and where we 
also have data on FISCAL OUTLAYS and institutional characteristics (QUALITY OF 
INSTITUTIONS, CORRUPTION, AND JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY). Some countries 
experienced multiple systemic crises during our sample period (for example, Argentina) 
and in these cases each systemic crisis is included in our sample. Since our sample of 
systemic crisis cases would be biased if certain country characteristics that can explain 
why some countries are more prone to systemic crises than others also affect the speed of 
recovery from a financial crisis, we also include a control group of (a) countries that did 
not experience a systemic crisis during the sample period, but that did experience a non-
systemic crisis (where we use the classification in Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) to 
identify whether the crisis is systemic or non-systemic), and (b) countries that did not 
experience a crisis at all during the sample period. Our total sample of 40 countries 
consists of 29 countries with a total of 32 systemic crises, five countries with a non-
systemic crisis, and six countries with no crisis. Naturally, for the non-crisis countries we 
do not have data on fiscal outlays, accommodative policies, and output losses. As data on 
some variables are also not available for some crisis countries, the sample size varies on 
the particular regressions used. See Appendix Table 1 for the raw data by (non) crisis   20
episode, and Appendix Table 2 for a list of crises covered and detailed information on 
each crisis. 
 
3.  Estimation results 
We are interested in measuring the effects of accommodative policies and a country’s 
institutional environment on fiscal outlays for crisis resolution and the speed of economic 
recovery in the aftermath of a banking crisis. We start our empirical analysis by 
investigating to what extent fiscal outlays vary with the quality of the institutional 
environment of a country.  Specifically, we regress FISCAL OUTLAYS on our three 
measures of country’s institutional environment (institutional quality, corruption, and 
judicial efficiency). We also include in these regressions the three specific 
accommodative policies—explicit guarantees, liquidity support, and forbearance—to 
investigate whether a country’s institutional environment can explain differences in fiscal 
outlays, after controlling for the effect of these accommodative policies. Finally, we 
include the credit growth variable to control for the impact of pre-crisis credit booms on 
fiscal outlays. 
  The econometric results of explaining fiscal outlays are presented in Table 1. The 
results are based on a sample of (both systemic and non-systemic) crisis countries, but 
exclude countries without information on fiscal outlays or policy variables, which means 
we end up with a sample of 35 countries. In terms of policy measures, we find that all 
three accommodative policies considered (substantial liquidity support, explicit 
guarantees and regulatory forbearance) add to fiscal outlays, consistent with the results in 
Honohan and Klingebiel (2003), and consistent with the view that government incur   21
fiscal costs to minimize the impact of the crisis. Government guarantees and forbearance 
are the policies associated with the highest fiscal outlays.  In terms of a country’s 
institutional environment, we find that a better institutional environment tends to lower 
fiscal outlays related to crisis resolution. Credit growth pre-crisis and implicit guarantees 
do not appear to be correlated with fiscal outlays once we control for institutions and the 
other three policies.  
  Next, we move to the output loss regressions. We are interested whether better 
institutions accelerate recovery, i.e., limit output losses.  We also want to investigate the 
effects of fiscal outlays on economic recovery, since in theory these are aimed at limiting 
output losses and speeding up economic recovery.  However, fiscal outlays may not 
represent policy choices, but rather result from institutional weaknesses. Indeed, the 
previous regression results showed that fiscal outlays are in part driven by the quality of a 
country’s institutions. We therefore do not include the fiscal outlays variable itself into 
our output loss regressions, but rather the residual term of a regression of fiscal outlays 
on the three institutional variables.
13 This residual term captures “excessive” fiscal 
outlays in the sense that a positive value indicates that the country incurred greater fiscal 
outlays to address its crisis than a country with a similar level of institutional 
development. This “excessive” fiscal outlay variable thus captures those fiscal costs 
purely associated with accommodative policies, such as the three specific policies 
documentedsubstantial liquidity support, explicit guarantees, and regulatory 
                                                 
13 The results that follow do not alter qualitatively if we use the fiscal outlay variable itself rather than the 
fiscal outlay residual variable.   22
forbearanceas well as other fiscal outlays aimed at crisis recovery, such as debt relief 
schemes for bank borrowers, not documented.
14  
  The output loss regression results are reported in Table 2.  The results are based on 
a sample of (both systemic and non-systemic) crisis countries, but exclude countries 
without information on fiscal cost or institutional variables. The first part of the table 
reports the results with OUTPUT LOSS (IMF) as dependent variable and the second part 
of the table reports the results for OUTPUT LOSS (BARRO) as dependent variable.   
We find that accommodative policies do not achieve their intended goal of 
reducing output losses.  For both output loss measures we find that excessive fiscal 
outlays arising from accommodative policies do not tend to accelerate economic 
recovery.  In fact, the results indicate that accommodative policies even delay economic 
recovery as the signs are all positive (and generally statistically significant).  On the other 
hand, we find that a better institutional framework, as characterized by less corruption 
and greater judicial efficiency, does reduce output losses, even when controlling for 
excessive fiscal outlays. This result is robust for the corruption variable under the two 
output loss measures, whereas the indicators for the quality of institutions and judicial 
efficiency are only statistically significant for the BARRO output loss measure. 
  To test the robustness of these results, we run a number of other regressions.  It 
could be that the severity of a crisis is due to other factors, which may be correlated with 
the institutional and excessive fiscal outlay variables we use. This could lead us to 
wrongly conclude that the quality of the institutional environment and degree of 
                                                 
14 Even after controlling for institutional development, fiscal outlays may differ not only because a country 
makes more excessive use of accommodative policies or experienced bigger credit booms, but also because 
of differences in the severity of the crisis. As such, fiscal outlays may be endogenous to the speed of 
recovery from the crisis.  We did use 2SLS regressions to control for this possibility, but did not find 
qualitatively different results.   23
accommodative policies affect the speed of recovery. Obviously, many aspects, both 
domestic and international, can affect the speed of recovery and it is difficult to be 
exhaustive.  We nevertheless did consider a large number of other explanatory variables 
that should address most missing variables concerns. These additional variables included 
world GDP real growth at the start of the crisis, the presence of an explicit deposit 
insurance scheme at the onset of the crisis, the average inflation rate prior to the crisis, 
the degree of state ownership in banks, the degree of dollarization in the country, and the 
level of private credit to GDP. We did not find any of these variables to have a significant 
explanatory power on the speed of recovery nor to affect in a qualitative way the 
coefficients of the institutional environment and excessive fiscal outlay variables we use 
in Table 2 (we do not report these results).     
  A second robustness test investigates whether our results are biased because the 
possibility of a crisis occurring is related to the quality of institutions in the country. 
Institutionally worse developed countries may more likely have a deep crisis; studying 
only crisis countries could then lead us to conclude incorrectly that institutional factors 
determine the speed of recovery. To control for such potential sample selection bias, we 
estimate a Heckman model where the selection variable CRISIS takes the value of one if 
the country has experienced a crisis during the period 1977 to the present and the value of 
zero if the country has not experienced a crisis during this period.  In a second-stage 
regression for the speed of recovery, we then control for the selection bias related to the 
country’s institutional weaknesses. In this second-stage regression, we investigate again 
the importance of the institutional environment and the residual fiscal outlays on the 
speed of recovery. The Heckman regression results with CRISIS as dependent variable in   24
the first-stage regression and our two output loss variables as dependent variables in the 
second-stage regression are reported in Table 3.    
  The first-stage regression results confirm our prior that countries with weak 
institutions are more prone to crises. Unfortunately, our sample of non-crisis countries is 
small, only 6 observations, and the sample selection correction is thus not that powerful.  
The Heckman results should therefore be interpreted with the necessary caution.   The 
second-stage regression results nevertheless confirm our earlier findings based on OLS 
regressions: better institutions reduce output losses and excessive fiscal outlays retard 
recovery. Controlling for potential sample selection bias thus does not seem to affect the 
main result.  
Overall, we find that countries with weaker institutions tend to experience 
banking crises that take longer to recover from.  The likely channels are various. At the 
micro-level, the resolution of a crisis is likely to take longer in countries with weaker 
institutions, especially more inefficient legal institutions.  Good insolvency laws and 
well-functioning judicial systems are necessary to speedily restructure corporations in 
financial distress.  Good legal institutions are also crucial in resolving the debt overhang 
in the financial system and allowing bank balance sheets to be restored.  Efficient legal 
systems can help resolve the coordination problems between creditors and debtors.  At 
the more aggregate level, in weaker environments supervisory authorities, and policy 
makers more generally, may have limited ability and credibility to enforce prudential 
regulations against financial institutions, intervene in financial institutions that do not 
comply with prudential regulations, and encourage large corporations to restructure 
speedily.  As such, the recovery can be expected to take longer in institutionally weak   25
countries. The specific negative correlation between recovery and corruption, which is 
the most robust result, may indicate that more corrupt governments tend to provide 
assistance to banks and corporations not based on their financial soundness and 
compliance with regulations, but rather based on government ties with dominant 
shareholders and the business sectors in general and on political objectives.  This lack of 
market-based dealings thereby prolongs the recovery. 
Our second main result is that accommodative policy instruments, as reflected in 
excessive fiscal outlays, are not effective in terms of helping the country’s economy to 
recover faster and to minimize output losses.  Excessive fiscal transfers may mean that 
assistance is provided to institutions that have limited franchise value and fiscal support 
has then little effect on recovery. Fiscal outlays then represent more the costs of looting, 
with no economic gains, rather than support to reduce debt overhangs and overcome 
coordination problems in resolving claims.  
Overall, our empirical findings reveal that both poor institutions and 
accommodating policies can significantly slow the recovery from a financial crisis.  To 
gauge the relative importance of institutions and policies, Table 4 shows the effects of a 
change in excessive fiscal outlays or improvement in institutions on output losses, using 
both output loss measures. For these simulations, we use the regression results of Table 2. 
We find that a one standard deviation reduction in excessive fiscal outlays lowers the 
output losses according to the IMF definition by about 4.1 percent of GDP and according 
to the Barro definition by about 3.1 percent of GDP. In terms of institutional 
development, a country that improved its institutions by one standard deviation would 
have its predicted output losses using the IMF definition reduced by between 0.5 percent   26
of GDP (judicial efficiency) and 2.3 percent of GDP (corruption and quality of 
institutions) and using the Barro definition between 2.4 percent of GDP (judicial 
efficiency) and 4.8 percent of GDP (quality of institutions). These effects are sizeable. 
The results suggest that reductions in (excessive) fiscal outlays and improvements in the 
institutional environment are important economically, as both contribute about equally in 
terms of accelerating the recovery.  
 
4.  Conclusions 
We have examined the impact of accommodative policy instruments on fiscal costs of a 
crisis and on accelerating economic recovery in the aftermath of a crisis.  We then 
examined the link between the quality of a country’s institutional frameworks, the 
effectiveness of accommodative crisis resolution policies, as measured by the size of 
excessive fiscal costs associated with the crisis, and economic output losses.  We find 
accommodative policy measures, such as government guarantees on deposits and 
forbearance, to be fiscally costly, as also documented by Honohan and Klingebiel (2003).  
Moreover, when examining the question of whether these accommodative policy 
measures result in faster economic recovery, we find that output losses are not reduced by 
excessive fiscal outlays.  Therefore there does not appear to be a trade-off between the 
size of the fiscal cost and the speed of economic recovery.  Indeed, we find evidence that 
applying accommodative policies resulting in high fiscal outlays slows down economic 
recovery.  We do find evidence that a better institutional framework not only lowers 
fiscal outlays of crisis resolution but also reduces the economic costs of a crisis.    27
Accommodative policy measures are thus not only fiscally costly, they also do not 
accelerate economic recovery, rather they can even slow down economic recovery.  At 
the same time, the results suggest that sound legal and other institutions are important 
components for a resolution of the crisis that is not only cost-effective but also speedy.  
The best approach for a country to resolve a systemic crisis appears to be to implement 
strict resolution policies and focus on improving its institutional framework.  The 
importance of the quality of the institutional framework may not be surprising, as 
institutional development has often been found to be important for a country’s growth, 
productivity, and stability.  Our analysis, however, provides more motivation to 
disentangle the elements of the institutional framework that are most important to help 
reduce the costs of a financial crisis and improve the recovery from a crisis, and the 
“returns” of such improvements.  Such an analysis may in turn help guide policy makers 
in setting priorities for reform.   28
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Table 1. Explaining Fiscal Cost / GDP 
This table shows country-level regressions estimated through ordinary least squares.  Dependent variable is fiscal cost over GDP. The sample of countries is 
described in the Appendix Table 1.  The policy variables explicit guarantee, liquidity support, and forbearance are zero-one dummies where a one is assigned 
when the country implemented the policy instrument.  Implicit guarantee takes value one if deposits of state-owned institutions account for more than 75 percent 
of total banking deposits, and zero otherwise. Quality of institutions is a measure of the quality of institutions developed by KKZ (1999) and takes higher values 
when the quality of institutions is higher. Corruption index is a sub-component of the Political Risk Rating constructed by ICRG and takes higher values when 
lower levels of corruption are perceived. Efficiency of the judicial system takes higher values for countries with more efficiency and integrity of the legal 
environment. Credit growth is the difference between real private credit growth and real GDP growth. A constant is included but not reported.  Robust standard 
errors are in brackets.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Explicit guarantee  10.495**      12.574**      12.346**      8.057  8.902 
  (4.477)      (4.672)    (4.812)     (6.263)  (5.379) 
Implicit  guarantee  6.674     18.181    19.871     19.731  18.134 
  (8.187)     (20.800)    (18.195)     (16.879)  (16.822) 
Liquidity  support    7.411    8.640     9.253   5.370  6.715 
   (5.278)     (6.044)     (6.085)   (6.361)  (6.057) 
Forbearance      11.944***    13.336**     13.446**  11.939**  10.101** 
     (4.096)      (4.779)      (4.835)  (4.820)  (4.153) 
Quality  of  institutions  -6.245*  -6.535*  -4.254            
  (3.134)  (3.211)  (3.422)            
Corruption       -2.960***  -2.810**  -1.782           
        (1.047) (1.189) (1.258)           
Judicial  efficiency           -3.132***  -3.022**  -2.170*  -2.150**  -2.237** 
           (0.930)  (1.098)  (1.118)  (0.909)  (0.886) 
Credit  growth                 0.383 
                 (0.321) 
                 
Observations  35  35 35  26 26 26 26  26  26 26 26 
R-squared  0.21  0.17 0.23  0.38 0.26 0.33 0.40  0.29  0.37 0.55 0.58 
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Table 2. Explaining Output Loss 
This table shows country-level regressions estimated by ordinary least squares.  The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is the natural logarithm of 1 plus 
OUTPUT LOSS (IMF). The dependent variable in columns (4) to (6) is the natural logarithm of 1 plus OUTPUT LOSS (BARRO). QUALITY OF 
INSTITUTIONS is a measure of the quality of institutions developed by KKZ (1999) and takes higher values when the quality of institutions is higher. 
CORRUPTION is a measure of corruption developed by ICRG and takes higher values when lower levels of corruption are perceived. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY 
is a measure of the efficiency of the judicial system and takes higher values for countries with more efficiency of the judiciary. FISCAL COST RESIDUAL is the 
residual term in the regression of fiscal cost on quality of institutions, corruption, and judicial efficiency. A constant is included but not reported.  Robust 
standard errors are in brackets.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Output loss (IMF)  Output loss (Barro) 
Quality  of  institutions  -0.396    -0.651*    
  (0.341)    (0.341)    
Corruption   -0.223*    -0.280***   
   (0.109)    (0.092)   
Judicial efficiency     -0.041    -0.184** 
    (0.115)    (0.082) 
Fiscal  outlay  residual  0.052*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.023*  0.021**  0.020 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
        
Observations  28 28 28 27 27 27 
R-squared  0.28 0.36 0.25 0.21 0.32 0.19 
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Table 3. Explaining Output Loss: Heckman model 
This table shows country-level regressions estimated using Heckman’s maximum likelihood estimator. The dependent variable in the second stage regression in 
columns (1) to (3) is (the natural logarithm of 1 plus the) OUTPUT LOSS (IMF). The dependent variable in the second stage regression in columns (4) to (6) is 
(the natural logarithm of 1 plus the) OUTPUT LOSS (BARRO). The dependent variable of the first-stage regression is CRISIS, which is a dummy variable that 
indicates whether the country has experienced a financial crisis in the last 30 years, or not. QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS is a measure of the quality of 
institutions developed by KKZ (1999) and takes higher values when the quality of institutions is higher. CORRUPTION is a measure of corruption developed by 
ICRG and takes higher values when lower levels of corruption are perceived. JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY is a measure of the efficiency of the judicial system and 
takes higher values for countries with more efficiency of the judiciary. FISCAL OUTLAY RESIDUAL is the residual term in the regression of fiscal outlay on 
quality of institutions, corruption, and judicial efficiency. A constant is included but not reported.  Robust standard errors are in brackets.  *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Output loss (IMF)  Output loss (Barro) 
Quality  of  institutions  -0.089    -0.429    
  (0.379)    (0.425)    
Corruption   -0.390***    -0.324***   
   (0.034)    (0.094)   
Judicial efficiency     -0.082***    -0.146 
    (0.031)    (0.097) 
Fiscal  outlay  residual  0.054*** 0.043*** 0.061*** 0.023**  0.021**  0.020* 
  (0.016) (0.014) (0.000) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) 
        
First-stage        
Quality  of  institutions  -1.747***    -1.587***    
  (0.353)    (0.316)    
Corruption   -0.334***    -0.417***   
   (0.027)    (0.102)   
Judicial efficiency      -0.236***    -0.257*** 
    (0.020)    (0.062) 
        
Observations  35 34 34 34 33 33 
Censored  observations  7 6 6 7 6 6 
Uncensored  observations  28 28 28 27 27 27 
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Table 4: Estimated impact of changes in fiscal outlay and quality of institutions on output losses 
 
This table shows simulations for changes in output losses.  The results for the changes in output loss (IMF) and output loss (Barro) are based on the regression 
results from Table 2. The simulations calculate the effects on the outcome variables if the respective fiscal outlay were to be one standard deviation lower than its 
mean, or if the institutional index were to be one standard deviation higher than its mean. 
 
  Change in output loss (IMF)  
(as % of GDP) 
Change in output loss (BARRO) 
(as % of GDP) 
    
Fiscal outlays    
Excessive fiscal outlays  -4.14  -3.08 
    
Institutional framework    
Quality of institutions  -2.33  -4.79 
Corruption -2.34  -3.42 
Judicial efficiency -0.53  -2.43 
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Appendix Table 1. Description of variables 
Variable Name  Description  Source 
Fiscal outlay  The ex-post fiscal outlay estimate of financial distress as a percentage of GDP. It includes both fiscal and quasi-fiscal 
outlays for financial system restructuring, including the recapitalization costs for banks, bailout costs related to covering 
depositors and creditors, and debt relief schemes for bank borrowers. 
Honohan and Klingebiel 
(2003), and IMF (2003) 
Output loss (IMF)  Output loss, calculated as the sum of the differences between the actual and trend growth rates for the period t until the 
year in which the trend growth is reached, where trend GDP growth is calculated as the average of GDP growth rates 
from t-3 to t-1, and t is the starting year of the crisis. The approach follows IMF World Economic Outlook (1998) and 
the data are updated to include some recent crises. 
IMF World Economic 
Outlook (2002) 
Output loss (BARRO)  Same as output loss (IMF), but the trend growth is estimated as the predicted value from equation (2) in Barro (1991). 
The equation is: Average GDP per capita growth from 1960 to 1980 = 0.0302 - 0.0111 * GDP per capita in 1960 + 
0.00051 * (GDP per capita in 1960)^2 + 0.0323 * Secondary school enrollment rate + 0.0270 * Primary school 
enrollment rate - 0.122 * Government consumption/GDP - 0.0200 * Number of revolutions - 0.0309 * Number of 
assassinations - 0.0148 * Deviation from the PPP in 1960. The realizations of the last three variables are set to zero. 
The sources of the other variables are the Barro-Lee and Summers-Heston databases. We use GDP per capita and the 
school enrollment rates at three years before the start of the crisis.  Government consumption is averaged over the 
period 8 to 3 years before the start of the crisis. Per capita GDP is limited from above to $10,800. 
Barro (1991), Barro and 
Lee (1997), Summers and 
Heston (1991), IMF 
World Economic Outlook 
(2002) 
Explicit guarantee  This variable takes a value of one when the government issues an explicit guarantee to depositors in private banks, and 
zero otherwise. 
Honohan and Klingebiel 
(2003).  For Ecuador, we 
update the data with 
information provided by 
the World Bank Ecuador 
country team. 
Implicit guarantee  This variable takes a value of one when deposits of state-owned institutions account for more than 75 percent of total 
banking deposits (suggesting that market participants are implicitly protected), and zero otherwise. 
Honohan and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Liquidity support  This variable takes a value of one when the government provides substantial liquidity support to insolvent institutions 
and zero otherwise. Substantial is defined as liquidity support surpassing total aggregate financial system capital. 
Honohan and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Forbearance  This variable takes a value of one when the government gives forbearance in the sense that regulations (in particular 
loan classification and loan loss provisioning) are relaxed or the current regulatory framework is not enforced for at 
least a twelve months period to allow banks to recapitalize on a flow basis; or competition is restricted. 
Honohan and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Quality of institutions  Index of the quality of institutions. The measure refers to 1998 and captures six dimensions of institutional quality: (1) 
democracy, (2) political instability, (3) rule of law, (4) bureaucratic regulation, (5) government effectiveness, and (6) 
corruption. An increase in the index means better institutions. 
Kaufman, Kraay, and 
Zoido-Lobaton (1999)   36
Corruption  Measure of corruption in government. Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 
1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for higher levels of corruption. Original source is the 
International Country Risk Guide. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998).  
Judicial efficiency  Assessment of the efficiency of the legal environment as it affects business. Average between 1980 and 1983.  Scale 
from 0 to 10, lower scores represent lower efficiency levels. The original source is Business International Company. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998).   
Credit growth  Average real growth in bank credit to the private sector minus average real growth in GDP during the three years 
prior to the start of the crisis. 
Authors’ calculations 
using data from the 
International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database 
maintained by the 
International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).   37
Appendix Table 2. Country-level database 
Country  Type of crisis  Crisis period
Fiscal 
outlay  


















Argentina systemic  1980-82  55.1  17.0  25.0  no  yes  no  yes  0.33  6.02  6.00 
Argentina systemic  1995  2.0  12.2  7.3  no  no  no  yes  0.33  6.02  6.00 
Australia non-systemic  1989-92  2.0 0.0  0.0 no  no  no  no  1.41  8.52  10.00 
Austria no  crisis                1.37  8.57  9.50 
Belgium  no  crisis                0.90  8.82  9.50 
Brazil systemic  1994-99  13.2  0.0  0.0  no  no  no  yes  0.00  6.32  5.75 
Chile systemic  1981-83  42.0  46.0  25.1  no  no  yes  yes  0.87  5.30  7.25 
Colombia  systemic  1982-87  5.0 7.0 83.6  no  yes  yes no -0.41  5.00  7.25 
Czech Republic  systemic  1989-91  12.0 0.0    yes  no no yes 0.68     
Ecuador systemic  1998-2001  20.0  12.0  0.0  yes  no  yes  no  -0.32  5.18  6.25 
Finland systemic  1991-94  11.2  21.0  16.7  yes  no  yes  no  1.62  10.00  10.00 
France non-systemic  1994-95  0.7  0.0  2.7  no  no  no  no  1.02  9.05  8.00 
Ghana  systemic  1982-89  6.0 7.0 22.6  no  yes  yes  yes  -0.14     
Hungary systemic  1991-95  10.0  14.0  36.4  no  yes  yes  yes  0.87    
Indonesia  systemic  1997-2002  55.0 39.0  35.0 yes  no yes  yes  -0.76 2.15 2.5 
Ireland no  crisis                1.40  8.52  8.75 
Jamaica systemic  1996-2000  43.9  7.0  32.3  yes  no  yes  yes  -0.03     
Japan systemic  1991-  24.0  48.0  4.5  yes  no  yes  yes  0.95  8.52  10.00 
Jordan  non-systemic  1989-90  10.0  16.9  12.9        0.33  5.48  8.66 
Korea, Rep. of  systemic  1997-2002  28.0  17.0  10.0  yes  no  yes  yes  0.48  5.3  6.00 
Malaysia systemic  1997-2001  16.4  33.0  11.9  yes  no  yes  yes  0.51  7.38  9.00 
Mexico systemic  1994-2000  19.3  10.0  14.5  yes  no  yes  yes  -0.07  4.77  6.00 
Netherlands  no  crisis                1.64  10.00  10.00 
New  Zealand  non-systemic  1987-90  1.0 0.0 10.2  no  no  yes no 1.59  10.00  10.00 
Norway systemic  1990-93  8.0  0.0  0.0  yes  no  yes  no  1.53  10.00  10.00 
Paraguay systemic  1995-2000  13.0  0.0  22.9  yes  no  yes  yes  -0.56     
Philippines systemic  1983-87  3.0 26.0 38.3 no  no  yes yes 0.21 2.92  4.75   38
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Philippines systemic  1998-  13.2  10.1 19.1  no  no  no no  0.21  2.92  4.75 
Poland systemic  1992-95  3.5  0.0  0.1  no  yes  yes  yes  0.70     
Portugal  no  crisis                1.20  7.38  5.50 
Senegal systemic  1988-91  17.0  0.0  4.8  no  yes  yes  yes  -0.30     
Slovenia systemic  1992-94  14.6  0.0  6.2  yes  no  no  yes  0.85    
Spain systemic  1977-85  5.6  0.0    no  no  yes  no  1.11  7.38  6.25 
Sri Lanka  systemic  1989-93  5.0  1.0  7.8  yes  no  no  yes  -0.38  5.00  7.00 
Sweden systemic  1991-94  4.0  11.0  2.6  yes  no  no  no  1.53  10.00  10.00 
Switzerland  no  crisis                1.72  10.00  10.00 
Thailand systemic  1997-2002  34.8  40.0  26.7  yes  no  yes  yes  0.15  5.18  3.25 
Turkey systemic  1982-85  2.5  0.0  3.7  no  no  no  no  -0.33  5.18  4.00 
Turkey systemic  2000-  30.5  0.0  12.9  yes  no  yes  yes  -0.33  5.18  4.00 
United States  non-systemic  1988-91  3.2  0.0  0.0  no  no  no  yes  1.29  8.63  10.00 
Uruguay systemic  1981-84  31.2  41.0  19.8  no  yes  yes  yes  0.56    
Venezuela systemic  1994-95  22  14.0  12.5  no  no  yes  yes  -0.37  4.70  6.50 
 